Foreign direct investment has become an important factor of development of economies in the last decades. However, its economic nature as well as its relationship with corruption has not yet been clarifi ed in economic literature. Following previous theoretical research, mainly Dunning's eclectic model, this paper evaluates the econo metric relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment by testing three theoretically-based hypo theses: that corruption perception indicator is a stationary variable, that the relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment stock is statistically weak and that changes in foreign direct investment stock do not Granger cause changes in corruption. The verifi cation is based on unit root tests, panel co-integration and Granger causality models performed on data from the Transparency International, the World Bank and the Heritage Foundation and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) for 94 countries for the years 1998-2007. The results show that there is no signifi cant relationship between the two variables.
Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has become an important factor of development of economies in the last decades. Having numerous advantages, it has, however, not been proved to improve all aspects of the host country, especially its political environment. In this paper, we attempt to present a theoretical explanation and econometric verifi cation of this fact on relation between corruption and FDI with the help of mainstream economic understanding of FDI and quantitative methods: unit root tests, panel co-integration models and panel Granger causality models.
The paper is divided into six parts beginning with the theoretical concept and ending with econometric results and general conclusion. Before the Public Choice Theory constituted the concept of governmental failure, Hymer (1960 and 1976) and Kindleberger (1969) both stated that, as the competitive advantage of domestic com panies does not materialize in the long-run and there is still plenty of thriving MNCs, some kind of a market failure must exist. Mainstream economists, in general, accepted this claim: e.g. Vernon and Wells (1972) and Caves (1982) used product life cycle theory as an explanation. However, profound incorporation of the idea into mainstream economics can be attributed to Dunning (1998) and his eclectic model of international production. In this paper, we follow Dunning's fi ndings, particularly his defi nitions of two advantages of MNCs.
The fi rst one is the advantage of the so-called "net ownership", which is internal for MNCs and is easily used in different countries. This advantage, such as trademarks, patents, know-how and other kinds of intellectual property, is crucial for MNCs. On the contrary, domestic companies do not possess such a benefi t. The second one is the advantage of location, which depends on the character of the host country and is external for MNCs (it depends on the environment created by the host country's government through investment incentives schemes).
It is signifi cant in the Dunning's concept that both advantages are of importance. Both are also dependent on governments of host countries and intergovernmental agreements and treaties, respectively. The length of the patent, the conditions of trade mark registration or license, the availability of monopoly over a certain resource or service, as much as tax holidays, fi nancial or regulatory incentives, subsidized infrastructure are all forms of support available to MNCs, if agreed with the government of the host country. At the same time, the presence of MNCs is viewed by many politicians as an important 1 In 1969 the only rational explanation of this problem was the fact that MNCs, operating globally, could optimize their costs by a) achieving economies of scale and b) delocalizing their production and having a richer choice of suppliers. In this paper, we exclude both factors from our analysis, as it is not clear whether these factors are the cause or the effect (which is more likely) of MNCs special advantages.
economic benefi t and thus is supported; see e.g. the case of the Central and Eastern Europe.
Therefore, FDI seems to emerge more on political than economic (effectiveness-driven) basis and is linked to government interventions into the economy. If this relation had been broken, MNCs ceteris paribus would, most likely, be unable to pay for operations in various markets and would have to leave those markets, or, at least, they would face an important increase in costs and therefore in prices of their production. It is possible to state that MNCs are partly subsidized by governments, as in case of a protectionist trade policy; see Table 1 for comparison of the both. A logical summary of this theory can be found e.g. in Evan (2006 and . Evan (2006) uses the notion "neomercantilism" for intense government intervention in favour of FDI due to its similarity to the corresponding trade policy (focus on the wealth of own country). 
Relationship between FDI and Corruption
It is often claimed that a good political environment, expressed e.g. by a democratic government and low corruption, is the main attraction for foreign direct investment (FDI). This opinion is still occa sionally present in economic literature despite the fact there is little econometric evidence supporting it. Taking into account the above-presented theory, we are, however, more inclined to believe this claim not to be true for two main theoretical reasons. Secondly, the nature of incentives as subsidies itself, strengthened by a stronger position of MNCs (there is more competition on the side of host countries over FDI than on the side of investors) leads to negotiations between MNCs and governments of the host countries, which may be subject to corruption and lobbyism, i.e. MNCs private or public offerings to politi cians/governments in exchange for additional advantages. 4 MNCs affi liates in host countries may also unwillingly (in case of systemic corruption) or, in certain cases, even willingly (if acceptable in MNCs culture) participate in corruption practices.
The requirement of a good political environment may therefore be in practice com pensated by government interventions (incentives) and by the culture of MNCs themselves, which may lead to weak or no relation between corruption and FDI.
Previous Theoretical and Econometric Studies
From the theoretical perspective, there is a large body of evidence of Dunning ownershiplocation advantages for different groups of countries. Lee and Mansfi eld (1996) in their comprehensive study proved for the case of the US MNCs, the largest investors in the world according to UNCTAD, a direct relationship between protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) and receipts of unaffi liated royalties and licensing fees or incomes for the MNCs from FDIs in the host country. In the Czech Republic, a major FDI destination in the Central and Eastern Europe, there is also certain evidence supporting the link between investment incentive schemes presented or enlarged by the governmental agency CzechInvest and the increase in FDI infl ow, see Dupal (2009) . Petříček (2003) and Benáček (2010) also support the Dunning eclectic model, particularly the location advantage, with empirical evi dence. Similar conclusions have been reached for Brazil, 3 Investment incentives in this respect usually represent additional "costs" for public fi nance, which further deteriorate existing budget defi cits in some and lead to overall higher taxation in other countries.
4
Lobbyism in some forms can be considered as a legally acceptable form of corruption.
Russia, India, China and South Africa (the BRICS countries), see Vijayakumar, Sridharan and Rao (2010) Harrison (2003) shows that certain corrupt low potential countries are able to attract FDI infl ows while others are not. In total, there is little empirical evidence of a strong negative link between CPI and FDI infl ows in economic literature, which supports the theoretical assumptions.
Econometric Approach Developed in this Paper
In this paper, we examine the relationship between corruption, measured by a corruption perception indicator/index (CI), and foreign direct investment stock in a country in relative terms (FDI stock), as a measurement of long-term FDI infl ows, on a panel dataset.
From the above presented theory and previous econometric studies on the topic, it is perceivable that the relationship between CI and FDI stock should be relatively weak due to the compen sation effect created by investment incentives and MNCs culture, which will be the base of our hypothesis. However, the absence/weakness of an economic relationship can be econometrically ex pressed in more than one way. In general, it is possible to distinguish between four possible econo metric relationships between CI and FDI stock; see Table 2 .
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Note: FDI stock can be considered non-(constant)stationary due to the existence of a time trend in most countries. Source: self-prepared.
From the table it is perceivable that the fi rst three cases represent the absence / weak ness of relationship between CI and FDI stock and the last one -a signifi cant relation. Therefore, we will have to test three interrelated hypotheses: SC, WCC and NCC. This will help to determine the type of the econo metric relationship between corruption and FDI.
Testing SC hypothesis -methodology
In the theory of statistics, see e.g. Arlt (1999) , the defi nition of stationarity (weak stationarity / short memory) 5 of a time series (X t ) consists of three simultaneous conditions for all t, k, h and m:
2) The expectation of X t is fi nite and does not depend on t, E(X t ) = E(X t+k ) = < ∞;
3) The covariance between X t+m and X t depends only on m and does not depend on t, COV(X t+m , X t ) =COV(X t+m+h , X t+h ).
Non-stationarity or integration of degree d, of the time series, i.e. X t (presence of the unit root/long memory), is then the case when only the d-th differ ence of X t (Δ d X t ) fulfi lls the criteria of stationarity (in this paper, we will work mostly with the fi rst differences). 5 Hereafter, by using the term "stationarity", we will refer to the weak stationarity. The term strict or strong stationarity will be reserved for processes like independent and identically distributed random variables (iid).
To test the SC hypothesis and obtain accurate results, we use two unit root tests on CI: the augmented Dickey and Fuller (1979) , ADF, test and the Kwiatkowski-PhillipsSchmidt-Shin (1992) , KPSS, test. 6 Both tests include a constant and no time trend (as stated in SC).
As the ADF and KPSS tests are applicable only to time series, to estimate the degree of integration (0 is stationarity, 1 and higher -unit roots) of panel data, their results for cross-sections have to be assessed with the help of another method. In this paper, we use Choi's (2001) meta-analysis where the overall (composite) p-value is calculated from the p-values of ADF tests and p-value range estimations of KPSS tests in individual cross-sections.
Panel data can be then considered stationary and SC proved, if the overall p-value is lower (in case of the ADF test) or higher (in case of the KPSS test) than 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1.
Testing WCC hypothesis -methodology
To test the WCC hypothesis for a single year or cross-section, it would be suffi cient to use a standard Pearson (product-moment) correlation coeffi cient (PCC), 7 which varies from -1 to 1 inclusively, as a measure ment of linear dependence between CI and FDI stock.
In a panel dataset, time or cross-sectional variation of PCC values can, however, be important, thus an estimation of a functional relationship is preferable. For this purpose we use a panel co-integration regression model (i.e. with correction for spurious relationships).
A panel co-integration model is a modifi cation of the time series co-integration model, see e.g. Engle and Granger (1987) and Arlt (1997) , and can be defi ned as a regression model where a) dependent and explanatory variables (regressors) are integrated of the same degree (at least 1) and b) the residuals are stationary. 8 The model can be defi ned in the following form for unobserved/pooled and random effects (in this paper, we omit fi xed effects, see below):
where i and t stand for the cross-sections and corresponding years and i for random effects.
6 Unlike other hypothesis testing, there is no single methodology for verifying the presence of unit roots in time series. Therefore, it is always advisable to use more than one test. ADF and KPSS also have different logic: the H0 hypothesis of the ADF test is the presence of a unit root in the time series, whilst the H0 of the KPSS test is the time series' stationarity.
7
This would include eventual de-trending for time series.
8
In the approach developed by Engle and Granger, in order to form a co-integration relationship, the residuals of a regression model need to be integrated in a lower degree than the dependent and explanatory variables. In econometric rela tionships, however, the condition of zero integration is more frequently used.
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Due to the absence of single approach to panel unit root testing, panel co-integration techniques also vary among authors. The latest important contribution to this problem was made e.g. by Kao (1999) .
In this paper, we refer to the Choi's (2001) meta-analysis approach under the assumption that cross-sections in CI and FDI stock are almost homo genously integrated to the same degree and that the residuals of the model are almost homoge nously stationary. This enables Choi's meta test to be an accurate measure ment of co-integra tion relationships with a small degree of mistakes (presence of non-coin tegrated relation ships between panel datasets).
Provided this assumption holds, WCC will be proved, if SC is true or there is co-integration between CI and FDI stock and a) the R 2 of the pooled regression is relatively small and/ or b) the regression coeffi cient of FDI stock is not statistically signi fi cant (p-value is greater than 0.1).
Testing NCC hypothesis -methodology
To test the NCC hypothesis, we use a panel Granger causality test (an F-test of relationship between the dependent variable and lagged values of an explanatory variable) for fi rst differences in CI and FDI stock under the condition of their stationarity (which is a requirement of the test). This method was developed by Granger (1969) for time series data.
The panel version of the Granger test is relatively new to econometrics and is still in process of deve lopment. The main contributors to this topic are Hurlin and Venet (2001) , Hurlin (2004a and 2004b) and Hurlin and Dumitrescu (2012) and e.g. Hood, Kidd and Morris (2006) , as well as several other authors.
The model can be expressed in the following form under the assumption of equal number of lags (k) 9 for all variables for unobserved / pooled effects and random effects (fi xed effects are omitted, see below):
,0 , , , 11
where i and t stand for cross-sections and years and k for the number of lags.
The main problem of the panel Granger causality models is the absence of a single method of overall causality assessment. Hurlin (2004b) proposes a χ 2 -test based on the ave rage 9
We will use this frequently applied restriction due to the small number of years in panel data, see below. Wald (1943) statistic, 10 which is, in fact, very similar to Choi's (2001) meta-analysis appro ach. However, as this test is not part of standard statistical software packages, it requires manual computing of Wald statistics for each cross section, which becomes diffi cult in bigger datasets (as in our case, see below).
In this paper we will therefore refer to the general logic of relationships between dependent variable and regressors in a panel regression (as Granger causality test is based on a standard regression model) by comparing between-group and total variance. A relatively low share of between-group variance (less than .5) will enable the overall Wald test to be consi dered a relatively accurate estimation of the overall causality (homogenous causality or non-causality, HC and HNC, Hurlin and Venet, 2001 ), otherwise we can speak of a mixed, diffi cultly interpretable result (heterogeneous causality or non-causality, HEC and HENC).
The NCC will be proved when SC and WCC are true or a) the conditions for the overall Wald test are met (otherwise, the results will be diffi cult to interpret) and b) coeffi cients of lagged changes in FDI stock are not statistically signifi cant.
Problem of corruption indicator estimation and data availability
Calculations of the SC, WCC and NCC hypotheses also need to be adjusted to two pro blems.
Firstly, CI unlike FDI stock is calculated on the basis of surveys and therefore is a subjective measure of corruption whose estimates may vary among institutions. Therefore, to obtain robust results, we use CIs from three different sources: the Transparency International's Corrup tion Perception Index (CPI), the World Bank Control of Corruption Indicator (COC), a part of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) database, and the Heritage Foundation's Free dom from Corruption Index (FFC), and a part of the Index of Econo mic Freedom (IEF).
For FDI stock, we use the data from the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) UnctadStat database, expressed as percentage of GDP, in order to refl ect eco nomic growth in countries.
11
Secondly, we do not possess enough data to cover all countries of the world. In order to obtain a consistent dataset on CIs and FDI stock and ex clude the infl uence of the global crisis (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) , 12 we could select data only for 94 countries for the years 1998-2007 10 Wald F-tests are used to estimate the statistical signifi cance of a group of explanatory variables in the model. 11 Alternatively, it is possible to use FDI stock per capita. FDI stock in terms of GDP, however, allows us to refl ect economic development, which can exceed the growth of FDI stock in terms of population in some of the countries, and thus correct for overstatement of importance.
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14 The time series are therefore short, which may lead to lower estimate quality (the problem is addressed below). The list of countries can be found in Appendix.
Our dataset therefore represents a sample, which may not be an accurate representa tion of the entire population. Unfortunately, at present, there are no widely used statistical methods to solve this problem with the exception of several, e.g. Kelley and Maxwell (2003) esti mators. Thus, in this paper, we attempt to solve it through traditional statistical methods: a) Using random effects models instead of fi xed effects (the sample is in fact ran domly created) and b) Including two factors in regression models, which we assume to refl ect the differences between countries: the economic level, measured by real GDP per capita, and cultural dimension expressed as geographic location in one of thirteen regions (Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, North America, Central America and Caribbean, Latin America, Middle/Central Asia, Southeastern Asia, Other Asia, Middle East, Northern Africa, Other Africa and Pacifi c expressed as 12 dummy varia bles).
15
These corrections enable us to use the original sample without excluding high or low corruption countries or dividing it into two groups, as in the study of Caetano and Caleiro (2005) . We also apply Newey-West (1987) standard errors estimator (HAC) in pooled panel regression models in order to provide for heteroscedasticity and improve the estimates' quality, i.e. to compensate for the length of the paneled time series. Table 3 compares cha racteristics of distributions of the three CIs (CPI, COC and FFC) and asses ses their mutual correlation with the help of Pearson correlation coeffi cients (PCC).
Results
From this table it is perceivable that all the three CIs have similar mean values (around 5, 0 and 50), median values (somewhat slightly below 5, 0 and 50) and variation (values of the C. V. are around 50% except for COC which has different measurement units). All the three distribu tions are positively skewed (more numerous are countries with lower CI values, i.e. higher corruption) and platykurtic (U-shaped, having two peaks: for high and very low corruption), thus not normal (Gaussian); see the example in Figure 1 below.
13 Values before 1998 were not available for some of the CIs, mainly CPI.
14 Due to the high correlation between the three CIs (see below), we estimated missing values with the help of other CIs, mainly FFC as the most complete dataset, using averages and regression analysis.
15 Western Europe is selected as the default geographic region. Russia is included in the Eastern Europe, Turkey in the Middle East and Australia and New Zealand in the Pacifi c. 
Figure 1 Distribution of CPI in Comparison with the Normal Distribution
Note: χ 2 (2) -statistic is greater than the 1% percentile for 2 degrees of freedom, thus CPI is not normally distri buted at the 99% probability level. Source: Gretl, self-prepared. It is also perceivable that variation between cross-sections is signifi cantly greater than within cross-sections, which makes the sample signifi cantly heterogeneous and requires the use of resampling, break-up into groups or corrections for its adjustment (as in our approach).
Nevertheless, as all the three CIs are mutually correlated of more than 95% (which actually proves that surveys conducted by different institutions can estimate corruption rela tively accurately), 16 it is suffi cient to concentrate only on one CI in future calculations. We will focus our attention on the Heritage Foundation's FFC index, as the most complete dataset (whose values did not need to be interpolated). Others will be used as additional verifi cation.
Stationarity Condition (SC)
The results of the Choi meta-tests based on ADF and KPSS tests for 94 countries are presented for FFC and additionally for CPI and COC in Table 4 . Note: The number of lags was selected with the help of the Schwert (1988, p. 7) criterion for yearly data: Int( 4(T/10)^.25 ), where Int is integer function and T is the number of years (in our case T = 10).
Source: Gretl, self-prepared.
The Choi meta-tests show that FFC (and also CPI and COC) is heterogeneous in terms of integration, but mostly stationary. The share of stationary time series in the panel datasets is 70 / 94, i.e. 74.5% (69.1% and 73.4%) . 17 The SC criterion is not strictly met according to our defi nition, however, the share may be suffi cient for this hypothesis to be still true, if co-integration relationships between CI and FDI stock time series are not numerous. 17 As the results are approximately the same, we will refrain from using CPI and COC in further calculations. Note: The number of lags was selected with the help of the Schwert (1988, p. 7) criterion for yearly data: Int( 4(T/10)^.25 ), where Int is integer function and T is the number of years (in our case T = 10).
The Choi meta-tests show that FDI stock is also heterogeneously integrated, but mostly non-stationary. The share of non-stationary time series in the panel datasets is 67 / 94, i.e. 71.3%. According to the probability theory, there is therefore a (1 -0.745) * 0.713 * * 100% = 18.2% chance that time-series in FFC and FDI stock are simultaneously non-stationary. The probability of a co-integration relationship (of stationarity of residuals) is thus even lower, e.g. 9.1%. (if the probability of residuals being stationary is 50%).
This means that there is a 81.8-90.9% probability that time series in the datasets fl uctuate around a cer tain value or their mutual relationship is spurious.
To check the possible co-integration relationship in part of the time series (the WCC hypothesis for a part of datasets -it is impossible to perform an overall evaluation due to the heterogeneity in integration), we reduce the FFC and FDI stock datasets to only non-statio nary time series, according to the results of ADF and KPSS tests (in total 20, see Appendix).
The results of the random effects model, see (2), extended to the real GDP per capita and geographical location dummies variables (left after the reduction) is presented in Table 6 . stock is not statistically signi fi cant (which proves the WCC hypothesis), weak and even has a negative sign (i.e. an increase in FDI stock increases corruption, as lower values of CIs represent high corruption) and e) the most important factor infl uencing FFC is the real GDP per capita.
The residuals of the model are normally distributed (χ 2 (2) -statistic is 1.328 with p-value of 0.515), but not homogenously stationary, see Table 7 . Note: The number of lags was selected with the help of the Schwert (1988, p. 7) criterion for yearly data: Int( 4(T/10)^.25 ), where Int is integer function and T is the number of years (in our case T = 10).
The co-integration relationship thus exists only for 13 countries and Choi meta-tests point to the almost homogenous non-stationarity of residuals.
Therefore, we can consider the SC hypothesis to be valid for 81 countries out of 94 (86.2%) and the WCC hypothesis -for the rest (13.8%). This automatically proves the NCC hypothesis without the need of using Granger causality tests, see (4). In fact, we can con sider SC to be roughly valid for the whole dataset. And, as all three hypotheses are proved, it is possible to state that, based on our sample, there seems to be no signifi cant (systematic) relationship between corruption and FDI at the world level, which confi rms the fi ndings of Harrison (2003) .
Can Improvement in Corruption Attract More FDI?
The fi nal question, which is important to ask, is whether there is certain causality between decreasing levels of corruption and increases in FDI (in the opposite direction compared to our analysis). From the theoretical point of view, the total improvement in business environment and good economic results indeed attract more FDI. However, our econometric verifi cation does not prove signifi cant relationship between corruption and FDI.
The changes in the levels of corruption and FDI, according to our results, are, most likely, caused by some third factors, e.g. the real GDP per capita (see the strong relationship between it and FFC for 13 countries), or are of a cyclical/repeated character (as CI are mostly stationary), e.g. in expansion phases of the business cycle. More research on this matter is, however, needed to draw reliable conclusions.
Conclusions
In this paper, we attempted to present a theoretical explanation and econometric verifi cation of the weak relation between corruption (as a representation of the political environment) and FDI infl ows in countries. After a theoretical explanation of compensation effects (investment incentives and cultural infl uences), we performed an econometric study using three theoretically-based hypo theses: that corruption perception indicator is a stationary variable (SC), that the co-integration relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment stock is statistically weak (WCC) and that changes in foreign direct investment stock do not Granger cause changes in corruption (NCC).
All hypotheses were proved on the panel data sample of 94 countries for the years 1998-2007. Increases in FDI stock therefore do not seem to improve the political environment of countries at the world level and vice versa. Used time series were, however, very short, which may affect the econometric results.
